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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRANK J. ALLEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
fJS.

SOUTHERX PACIFIC COlVIP ANY,
Defendant and Appellee.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District
Court of Weber County, Utah, the Honorable John A.
Hendricks, Judge thereof, presiding. For the convenience of the Court and counsel, the parties will be referred to as they were in the lower court, wherein the
appellant was the plaintiff and the appellee was the
defendant.
This appeal is on the judgment roll only. The only
question involved is whether the Findings of Fact of the
lower court support its Conclusions of Law and Judgment.
Plaintiff's complaint, omitting headings, signatures,
and verification, is as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

''Plaintiff complains of the defendant and
for cause of action alleges:
"1. That the defendant at all times hereinafter mentioned was a corporation organized and
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
State of Delaware, and authorized to do and
doing business in this state.

'' 2. That on or about the lOth day of September, 1947, the plaintiff, while in the City of
Portland, Oregon, and while enrout from said
city to Pocatello, Idaho, delivered and deposited
with the defendant, and defendant received from
plaintiff at the Union Station parcel room in
Portland, Oregon, as aforesaid, a place of business owned, operated, and under the control of
the defendant, one large Samsonite travelling bag
of the value of Forty Seven and 50j100 ($47.50)
Dollars, containing the follo"\\ring items, together
with their value on that date as follows:

1 diamond ring ----------------------------$650.00
1 21 jewel Longine watch____________ 375.00
1 stick pin -------------------------------------- 400.00
1 20-30 Colt revolver -------------------- 50.00
1 blue suit -------------------------------------- 85.00
1 tan gabardine suit -------------------- 87.50
2 pairs Edwin Clapp shoes__________ 38.00
2 Dobbs hats -------------------------------- 40.00
1 Lifetime Parker pen set__________ 65.00
1 white wool shirt ------------------------ 22.50
5 sport shirts -------------------------------- 10.00 each
1 dozen pure silk sox____________________
1.50 each
1 gabardine topcoat ____________________ 85.00
1 electric razor ------------------------------ 22.50
1 small portable radio ________________ 37.50
7.50 each
10 neckties (hand painted)
2
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4
2
1
1
1

neckties (hand painted) __________
pairs suspenders ---------------------comb and brush__________________________
aluminum cigarette lighter ____
dozen handkerchiefs ________________

10.00
2.50
4.50
4.50
.50

each
each
each
each

to be by 'the defendant safely and securely kept
for the plaintiff for a compensation, and to be
returned and re-delivered to the plaintiff upon
request, and the defendant then and there undertook to do so, and gave to the plaintiff a receipt
in writing for the property, as hereinbefore set
forth, said receipt bearing the number 396841.
'' 3. That thereafter, and within several hours
of his deposit, as hereinbefore described, plaintiff tendered to the defendant the receipt, as
hereinbefore mentioned, and demanded that said
defendant redeliver and return to the plaintiff
the said goods hereinbefore described.
'' 4. That the defendant did not take due care
of or safely keep the goods of the plaintiff, nor
did it, when requested, return or redeliver the
_same to the plaintiff, but on the contrary, the
travelling bag, together with the contents therein, was delivered by defendant to a Mrs. Alma
Burtraw, of Warrenton, Oregon, or some other
person or persons unknown to the plaintiff, and
that by and through such eonduct on the part of
the defendant, the goods were wholly lost to the
plaintiff, to his damage in the sum of Twenty
One Hundred Ninety ($2190.00) Dollars.
"WHIDREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment
against the defendant for the sum of Twenty
One Hundred Ninety ($2190.00) Dollatrs, for
costs of suit, and for such other and further relief
as the Court may deem proper."

3
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To this complaint defendant filed its second amended answer as follows (omitting heading, signatures and
verification) :
''Comes now the defendant Southern Pacific
Company and for its second amended answer to
plaintiff's complaint on file herein, admits, denies and alleges :
\
"1. Admits paragraph 1 of said complaint.

"2. Answering paragraph 2 of plaintiff's
complaint defendant denies each and every allegation ·therein contained.
'' 3. Answering paragraph 3, defendant admits that plaintiff tendered to defendant a receipt or parcel claim check bearing the number
396841 at Portland, Oregon, on or about September 10, 1947, and demanded that defendant return
to plaintiff a certain bag. Further answering
said paragraph 3 defendant denies each and every
other allegation therein contained.
'' 4. Answering paragraph 4 of said complaint
defendant admits that it did not deliver to plaintiff the hag or any of the items described in plaintiff's complaint. Further answering said paragraph 4, defendant denies each and every other
allegation therein contained.
'' 5. As a further, separate and affirmative
defense to plaintiff's complaint defendant alleges
that if plaintiff delivered to and deposited with
defendant any bag or baggage or articles, including the Samsonite travelling bag and its contents,
a.s described in plaintiff's complaint, such delivery and deposit were at all times mentioned in
said complaint under and subject to the terms
and conditions written upon the said claim check

4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

plaintiff alleg·es was given to him by defendant
upon the alleged delivery and receipt of said
bag; if plaintiff received any parcel check or
receipt as alleged in his complaint, then such
eheck or receipt was in words and figures as
follows:
·'NOTICE-Liability for loss of, damage or
delay to, any parcel limited to not exceed
$25.00 unless at time of deposit a greater
sum is declared and paid for at rate of 10
cents for each $25.00 or fraction thereof for
30 days or less. No parcel valued in excess
of $250.00 will be accepted. Parcels remaining on hand 30 days may be sold for charges.''
''On the re,Terse side thereof is printed these words:
"DATE AND TIME DELIVERED
''FOR EXCESS LIABILITY SElE NOTICE
ON OPPOSITE SIDE.
''Parcel storage rate, 10 cents for each 24
hours or fraction thereof. Maximum charge
for 30 days, $1.00. ''
"That defendant never issued to plaintiff,
at the time and place referred to in plaintiff's
complaint, or otherwise, any parcel check which
did not contain the foregoing provisions.
''That the alleged delivery to defendant of
said hag was also subject at all times stated in
said complaint to the conditions written upon a
notice defendant had posted at said check stand
at Portland, Oregon, when plaintiff alleges he
delivered said bag to defendant; that said notice,
then and there plainly visible to plaintiff and
others using said check stand, was in words and
figures as follows:

5
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c 'Protect Your
PARCELS
Our liability for Loss or Damage is
Limited to
$25.00

Greater value may be declared at time of
checking upon payment of lOc for each additional $25.00 value or fraction thereof.
Parcels or articles exceeding $250.00 in value
not accepted.''
"That the· above stated parcel check and
notice then and there required all persons, including plaintiff, checking any bag or parcels,
to dec.lare and pay for any value in excess of the
stated value appearing on said parcel check;
and said notice and parcel check gave notice at
all times named in plaintiff's complaint that defendant would not accept any bag or parcel valued
in excess of $250.00.
''That plaintiff then and there had notice
of the said provisions and terms of the said parcel ·
check and posted notice above set forth;
"That plaintiff did not at the alleged time
of his making the alleged delivery and deposit
of said bag, nor at any other time mentioned
in said complaint, make any declaration of value
a.s to said bag or its contents nor pay the additional charge required in case of value in excess
of $25.00.
''WHEREFORE, defendant prays that
plaintiff take nothing by his complaint, and that
defendant recover for costs of court herein incurred.''

6
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To snrh second amended answer plaintiff replied
as follows (omitting- heading, sig-natures and verification):
'' Conws now the plaintiff, and for his reply
to the Second Amended Answer of defendant on
file herein, admits, denies, and alleg-es as follows:
•' 1. Replyjng to Paragraph ( 5) of defendant's said amended answer plaintiff admits that
the claim check which was given to him by the
defendant has printed upon it the following- words
and figures :
''NOTICE-Liability for loss of, damage or
delay to, any parcel limited to not exceed
$25.00 unless at time of deposit a greater sum
is declared ai~d paid for at rate of 10 cents
for each $25.00 or fraction thereof for 30
days or less. No parcel valued in excess of
$250.00 will be accepted. Parcels remaining
on hand 30 days may be sold for charges.''
''On the reverse side thereof was printed
these words :
"DATE AND TIME DELIVERED
''FOR EXCESS LIABILrrY SEE NOTICE
ON OPPOSITE SIDE.
''Parcel storage rate, 10 cents for each 24
hours or fraction there.of. Maximum charge
for 30 days, $1.00.''
and alleges that the said words and figures were
and are in fine print upon said check, and plaintiff did not know the same was thereon, nor waH
the same brought to his notice or attention by
defendant or any other person until long after
defendant had failed and refused to return to
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plaintiff the bag m~d contents thereof deposited
with defendant, as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, and plaintiff deposited and checked the
said bag and the contents thereof, and accepted
the claim check from defendant without any
notice or knowledge that the said wording or
any part thereof appeared upon the said claim
check, and that he would not have deposited his
said. bag and the contents thereof with the defendant had he known or been advised that de··
fendant would accept the same, or attempt to
accept the same, only upon the terms and conditions appearing upon said claim check in fine
print as aforesaid. Plaintiff further admits that
he did not, at the time of delivering the bag and
its contents to defendant, as set forth in plaintiff's complaint, make any declaration of value
as to the said bag or its contents, nor pay any
cparge for defendant's acceptance of the same
other than as set forth in plaintiff's complaint
and plaintiff alleges that he was not asked or
called upon to make any declaration of value.
''Further replying to Paragraph (5) of defendant's said amended answer, plaintiff denies
each and every other allegation therein contained
not hereinbefore specifically admitted.''
Upon the issues thus raised, the action was tried
by the lower court sitting without a jury on February
23, 19.49. The lower court, after submission of the cause
to it, made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as follows (omitting heading):
'' Thi., cause came on regularly for trial before the Court, the Hon. John A. Hendrick.;;,
Judge thereof, presiding and sitting ·without a
jury, on the 23rd day of ],ebruary, 1949, on the

8
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complaint and reply of the plaintiff and the
amended answer of the defendant, Neil R. Olmstead and Clyde C. Patterson appearing as attorneys for plaintiff, and Ray, Quinney & Nebeker appearing as attorneys for defendant. EvidenCt" \HlS offered by the respective parties and
the cause was submitted to the Court for its decision, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises, now makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
•'1. That defendant Southern Pacific Company at all times hereinafter mentioned was a
corporation duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, and authorized to do and doing business
in the State of Utah.

'' 2. 'rhat on or about the lOth day of September, 1947, the plaintiff, while in the City of
Portland, State of Oregon, and while en rout from
said city to Pocatello, Idaho, delivered and deposited with the defendant, and the defendant
received from the plaintiff at the Union Station
parcel room in Portland, Oregon, as aforesaid, a
place of business owned, operated, and under the
control of the defendant, one large Samsonite
traveling bag of the value of Forty-Seven and
50j100 ($47.50) Dollars, containing the following
items, together with their value on that date as
follows:
1
1
1
1
1

diamond ring ------------------------------$650.00
21 jewel Longine watch ____________ 375.00
stick pin -------------------------------------- 400.00
20-30 Colt revolver -------------------- 50.00
blue suit -------------------------------------- 85.00
9
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1 tan gabardine suit --------------------

2
2
1
1
5

1

1
·1

1
10
4
2
1

1
1

pairs Edwin Clapp shoes _________ _
Dobbs hats ---------------------------------Lifetime Parker pen set. __________ _
white wool shirt -----------------------sport shirts -------------------------------dozen pure silk sox___________________ _
gabardine topcoat -------------------electric razor -----------------------------small portable radio -:---------------neckties (hand painted) _________ _
neckties (hand painted) _________ _
pairs suspenders ---------------------comb and brush -------------------------aluminum cigarette lighter _____ _
dozen handkerchiefs _______________ _

87.50
38.00
40.00
65.00
22.50
10.00
1.50
85.00
22.50
37.50
7.50
10.00
2.50
4.50
4.50
.50

each
each

each
each
each
each

to be by the defendant safely and securely kept
for the plaintiff for a compensation and to be
returned and redelivered to the plaintiff on request, and the defendant then and there undertook to do so, and gave the plaintiff a receipt iu
writing for the property, as hereinbefore set
forth, said receipt hearing the number 396841.
That the total value of the said bag and contents thereof so delivered by plaintiff to defendant was in the sum of Two Thousand One Hundred Ninety ( $2,190.00) Dollars.
"3. That thereafter, within several hours of
his deposit, plaintiff tendered to the defendant
his said receipt and demanded that the defendant
redeliver and return to the plaintiff the goods
hereinbefore described in Paragraph 2.
"4. That the defendant did not take due care
of or safely keep the goods of the plaintiff, nor
did it, when requested, return or redeliver the
10
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same to the plaintiff, but on the contrary, defendant delivered said bag, together with the
contents therein, to some ·person or persons unkno'\\rn to the plaintiff, and that in so doing, the
bag and its contents were wholly lost to the plaintiff.

.. 5.. That the parcel cheek, or receipt, given by
defendant to the plaintiff had printed upon it the
following words and fig·ures :
''NOTICE-Liability for loss of, damage or
delay to, any parcel limited to not exceed
$25.00 unless at time of deposit a greater
sum is declared and paid for at rate of 10
cents for each $25.00 or fraction thereof for
30 days or less. No parcel valued in excess
of $250.00 will be accepted. Parcels remaining on hand 30 days may he sold for char- ·
ges."
On the reverse side thereof was printed these
words:
"DATE AND TIME DELIVERED
''FOR EXCESS LIABILITY SEE NOrriCE
ON OPPOSITE SIDE
"Parcel storage rate, 10 cents for each 24
hours or fraction thereof. Maximum charge
for 30 days, $1.00."
"6. That defendant bad posted at its parcel
room at the Union Station in Portland, Oregon,
a sign in words and figures as follows:
''Protect Your
PAR C E'L S
Our Liability for Loss or Damage Is
Limited to
$25.00
11
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Greater value lnay be declared at time of
checking upon payment of 10 cents for eac11
additional $25.00 value or fraction thereof.
Parcels or articles exceeding $250.00 in value
not accepted.''
That said sign was posted in said parcel room in
a place where it was visible to plaintiff as he
checked his said bag and contents with the defendant.
"7. That the defendant, at the time of depositing said Samsonite bag and the contents
thereof with the defendant, at said parcel room~
did not read the printing on said parcel chec~.: and
receipt, an did not see nor read the sign posted
by the defendant, and neither the defendant nor
defendant's agents called plaintiff's attention to
the information contained on said printed portion
of the parcel check and receipt or to the information contained on the sign, as aforesaid, nor
did it i:t;l any way advise the plaintiff of any
specific conditions or terms under which it accepted the possession of the bag and its contents, and the plaintiff had no knowledge of any
limitation of liability on the part of the defend-

ant.
''The Court having made the foregoing
Findings of Fact, now reaches the following

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
"1. That defendant is liable to the plaintiff
for the value of plaintiff's bag and contents, but
that the extent of defendant's liability for such
loss was by contract limited to the sum of not to
exceed Twenty-Five ( $25.00) Dollars.

12
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"2. That plaintiff is entitled to judgment
ag-ainst the defendant in the sum of TwentyFive ( $25.00) Dollars.
•'3. That the plaintiff is entitled to recover
his costs of Court herein expended.
"Let Judg-ment be entered accordingly.
''Dated this 18 day of ~Iay, 1949.
/s/ John A. Hendricks
Judge"
Based upon such Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of La·w, it made and entered its Judgment as follows
(omitting heading):
"This cause came on regularly for trial be- ·
fore the Court, the Hon. John A. Hendricks,
Judge thereof, presiding and sitting without a
jury, on the 23rd day of February, 1949, on the
complaint and reply of the plaintiff and the
amended answer of the defendant, Neil R. Olmstead and Clyde C. Patterson appearing as attorneys for plaintiff, and Ray, Quinney and
Nebeker appearing as attorneys for defendant,
and the Court having heard the evidence and
having examined the proofs by the respective
parties, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises and having filed herein its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and having directed .that judgment be entered in accordance
therewith,
'' NO\V~ WHEREFORE, by reason of the
law and the findings aforesaid,
"IT S HEREBY ORDERED, ADtTUDGED,
AND DECREED:

13
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"1. That plaintiff have judgment against
the defendant for the sum of 'rwenty-Five
($25.00) Dollars.

"2. That plaintiff have and recover from the
defendant his costs taxed in the sum of_________________ _
Dollars.
"DATED THIS 18TH DAY OF

~fAY,

1948.

/s/ Jphn A. Hendricks
Judge''
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and J udgment were signed and entered by the lower court on
May 18, 1949. Thereafter, and within the time allowed
by law, namely, on July 5, 1949, plaintiff served and filed
his notice of appeal to this court and on the same date
filed his statutory undertaking on appeal to this court.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. The lower court, having found the facts as it did,
erred in its conclusions of law as follows :
"1. That defendant is liable to the plaintiff
for the value of plaintiff's bag ond contents, but
that the extent of defendant's liability for such
loss was by contract limited to the sum of not
to exceed Twenty-Five ($25.00) Dollars."
2. The lower court, having found the facts as it did,
erred in its conclusions of law as follows :
'' 2. That plaintiff is entitled to judgment
against the defendant in the sum of Twenty-Five
( $25.00) Dollars.''
3. The lower court, having found the facts as it did,
erred in its judgment as follows:

14
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"1. That plaintiff haYe judg-ment ag-ainst the
defendant for the sum of Twenty-Five ($25.00)
Dollars.''
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's assignments of er~·or, being each related
to the question of whether the Conclusions of Law and
Judgment limiting· plaintiff's recovery , to $25.00 are
proper under the Findings of Fact, the same, in the interest of brevity, will be considered together.
At the outset we point out that this appeal is upon
the judgment roll only, and without the evidence in the
case before this court. Under these circumstances, the
findings of the lower court are conclusive on appeal as
to the facts. Kinney vs. Lewis, 2 Utah 512.
The conclusion of the lower court that defendant's
liability to plaintiff is limited to the sum of $25.00 is
predicated upon the theory that the defendant, by printing the notice upon the parcel check given to defendant,
as set out in full under paragraph 5 of the Findings of
Fact, and by posting the sign at its check stand, as set
out in paragraph 6 of such Findings of Fact, limited the
amount that plaintiff might recover under the facts in
this case to $25.00. Plaintiff contends that the notice so
printed upon the check stub and the notice so posted by
the defendant in its parcel checkroom were wholly ineffective to so limit defendant's liability for the followIng reasons :
1. Because any such attempted limitation of liability
is wholly ineffective and void as against public policy.
2. That if such attempted limitation of liability is
I

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not ineffective and void generally, it is nevertheless ineffective to limit liability for defendant's conversion of
plaintiff's property.
3. That if such attempted limitation is not ineffective generally, or ineffective generally insofar as a conversion is concerned, it at most constitutes an offer on
the part of the defendant to limit its liability, which, to
be effective, must be accepted by the plaintiff, and no
such acceptance is shown here to have existed.
4. That even though it be held that plaintiff accepted
the limitation of liability offered by defendant, .nevertheless the limitation related solely to "loss of, damage
or delay to'' any parcel and did not by its terms purport
to relate to a loss resulting from defendant's conversion.
The arguments and authorities in support thereof
will now be considered seriatim. In so considering
plaintiff's argument, the court should bear in mind that
the court found in effect,
1. That the defendant was a bailee for hire. (Finding No. 2)
2. That as such bailee, it accepted plaintiff's bag
and contents of a value of $2,190.00. (Finding No. 2)
3. That instead of redelivering the bag to plaintiff,
defendant delivered the bag and contents to some other
person or persons unknown. Finding No. 4)
4. That while the parcel check plaintiff received had
printed thereon a purported limitation of liability, and
while defendant had posted at its check stand a notice
purporting to limit defendant's liability, the defendant
did not read the printing on the parcel check, nor see
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or read the sign posted by the defendant, nor did defendant in any '"ay advise the plaintiff of any specific
conditions or terms under which defendant accepted the
bag and its contents. (Finding No. 7)

I.
THE ATTE~IPTED LII\1ITATION OF LIABILITY IS WHOLLY INEFFECTIVE AND VOID AS
AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.
Appellant's first point of argument is that an attempted limitation of liability by a bailee for hire is
void as against public policy, and this is true whether
the basis of the bailor's action against the bailee is in
tort for con-.;-ersion, or negligence, although admittedly
the stronger argument is in the case of a conversion.
The following cases demonstrate this rule under factual
situations similar to the present.
Denver Union Terminal Railway Co. v. C'ltllinau, (Colo.), 210 P. 602.
In this case the Terminal Company operated a public check stand in its Denver terminal. Plaintiff checked
his bag and paid the required charge. Later when
plaintiff called for redelivery of his bag, it had disappeared. Defendant relied upon a limitation of liability of a notice posted at the check stand and printed
on the check stub plaintiff had received. In considering
this phase of the case, the court observed that the general
trend of authorities in the United States disaffirmed
the English rule, which permitted a limitation of liability, and in the course of its decision held as follows:
"The transaction under consideration was a bailment for hire in the course of the bailee's general
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dealing with the public. In such cases contracts
limiting liability for negligence are generally
against public policy, 6 C.J. 1112; Denver P.
W. Co. v. Munger, 20 Colo. App. 56, 77 Pac. 5;
Pilson vs. Tip-Top Auto Co., 67 Or. 528, 136 Pac.
642; Parris et al v. Jaquith, 70 Colo. 63, 197 Pac.
750.''
Further, in discussing the case of Noyes v. Hines,
220 Ill. App. 409, relied upon by the Terminal Company,
the court observed :
''In the Noyes Case the Illinois court goes only
to the extent of holding the bailor bound by the
terms of his check or receipt 'in so far as he
has reasonable notice of the same, and in so far
as the same are reasonable.' It does hold both
notice and terms reasonable. This holding is
based on the assumption that in the absence of
limitation the company would have been liable
fpr $100,000 in diamonds if so checked, that plaintiff would look for some limitation by reason of
the small charge, that, looking, he would discover the notice, and that he could read English,
and would therefore read the notice, none of
which assumptions seem to us reasonable. Receiving and caring for a bag of precious stones
has no relation to the company's business. l\[any
greater liabilities are assumed by business concerns on proportionally smaller charges. Numerous travelers cannot read English. Countless
check stands throughout the country receive and
care for valuable property where the bailment
is evidenced by a check containing only a number
and the· name of the bailee. Such checks carrying
a pretended contract are in fact the exception.
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'Vhen they do so there is no justifiable presumption that persons receiving them will inspect them for such a contract. The most, and
in fad the only, conspicuous thing on the check
before us is the number and the name of the
company.''
In the case of Union Pacific Railroad Company v.
Burk, 255 U. S. 317, 65 L. Ed. 656, the Supreme Court
of the United States held as follows:
d This court has consistently held the law to be
that it is against public policy to permit a common carrier to limit its common-law ,liability
by contracting- for exemption from the consequences of its own negligence or that of its servants.''
In the case of Agr·ic'ltlttfJral Insurance Cornpany v.
Constantine, (Ohio), 58 N. E. (2), the Ohio court held:
"The general rule is well stated in 6 American
Jurisprudence, 270, Section 176, which reads in
part as follows:
'It is now apparently well settled that a
bailee for hire cannot, by contract, exempt
himself from liability for his own negligence
or that of his agents or servants (Franklin
v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal. 680, 265 P.
936, 59 A.L.R. 118, Hotels Statler Co., Inc.
v. Safier, 103 Ohio St. 638, 134 N. E. 460, 22
A.L.R. 1190; Scott Auto & Supply Co. v.
McQueen, 111 Okl. 107 226 P. 372, 34 A.L.
R. 162; Sims v. Sullivan, 100 Or. 487, 198 P.
240, 15 A.L.R. 678; Sporsem v. First National
Bank of Poulsbo, 133 Wash. 199, 233 P. 641,
40 A.L.R. 854). Contracts limiting liabilityfor negligence in bailments for hire in the
course of a general dealing with the public
are generally regarded as against public
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policy.' Union Pacific R. Co. v. Burke, 255
U. S. 317, 41 S. Ct. 283, 65 L. Ed. 656;
England v. Lyon Fireproof Storage Co., 94
Cal. App. 562, 271 P. 532; Denver Union
Terminal Ry. Co. v. Cullinan, supra.''
In the case of England vs. Lyon Fireproof Storage
Company, (Cal.) 271 P. 532, the California court held:
''But a warehouseman may not limit his liability
for damage ·or loss of goods stored with him for
hire, so as to exempt himself from damages resulting from his own negligence, nor to relieve
himself from the exercise of ordinary care. The
trend of modern authorities holds that such an
effort on the part of a bailee to exempt himself
from negligence is contrary to public policy.''
In Inland Compress Company v. Sirnrnons (Okla.),
159 P. 262, the Oklahoma court held:
''We conclude that it would be against public
policy in this state to permit the defendant in
this case as a bailee for hire to contract in such
manner as to relieve it of any responsibility for
its own negligence, and that, the provision of the
receipt issued to the plaintiff in error attempting
to relieve the company from any liability on
account of damage, the result of its negligence
is void as against public policy. Therefore the
court did not err in instructing the jury to the
effect that such provision of the contract would
not protect the defendant against its own negligence.''
In Pilson v. Tip-Top .Auto Company, (Ore.), 136 P.
642, the Oregon court held :
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'"lt is the better rule that a bailee for hire cannot
by contract so limit his responsibility to the
bailor as not to be liable for his own negligence
or the negligence of his agents and servants.''

Other cases to the same effect are to be found in
citations referred to in the above decisions.

II.
IF SUCH ATTEMPTED LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY IS NOT INEFFECTIVE AND VOID
GENERALLY, IT IS NEVERTHELESS INEFFECTIVE TO Lil\IIT LIABILITY FOR DEFENDANT'S
CONVERSION O:B., PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY.
The instant case involves the question of liability
from the standpoint of defendant's conversion, rather
than defendant's negligence, and we submit a case of
conversion constitutes a much stronger case for disaffirming an attempted limitation of liability than perhaps a case of simple negligence.
The lower court, by its Finding No. 4, found that
defendant delivered plaintiff's bag to a person other
than plaintiff. 'l hat such constitutes conversion by the
defendant this court has held.
1

In the case of Potomac Insurance Co. v. Nickson,
64 Utah 395, 231 P. 445, this court held:
"Misdelivery, therefore, clearly distinguishes the
case at bar from a case where the property is
stolen or is lost through some other misadventure.
In a case of misdelivery, that act, in and of itself,
amounts to a conversion of the property held;
while the stealing of property intrusted to the
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bailee may or may not constitute conversion, depending upon his conduct and freedom from
negligence. ' '
Thus it is apparent that under the Utah law, defendant's misdelivery of the bailed property constituted
a conversion thereof, and defendants, purely as a matter of public policy, should not be permitted by contract to limit its liability for damages occasioned by
its own wrongdoing. Hence the case of Adams Express
Co. v. Berry & vVhitmore Co., 35 App. D. 208, 31 LR.A
(NS) 309, he-comes particularly in point. Here the
court held as follows:
"Is it possible for the carrier to extend this
doctrine of contractual limitation of liability to
cover cases where the goods are converted or
embezzled by it~ We think not. So great would
be the opportunity for fraud that public policy
will not suffe:r: a practice so manifestly calculated to invite it. That the shipper, in a particular instance, might be willing to make such a
concession, does not alter the rule; it is not
within the power of the individual to barter
away the right to protection inherent in the
general public.''
III
IF SUCH ATTEMPTED LIMITATION IS NOT
INEFFECTIVE GENERALLY, OR INEF],EC~riVE
GENERALLY INSOFAR AS A CONVERSION IS
CONCERNED, IT AT MOST CONSTITUTES AN
OFFIDR ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT
TO LIMIT ITS LIABILITY, WHICH, TO BE EFFECTIVE, :MUST BE ACGEPr~rED BY THE PI.JAINTIFF, AND NO SUCH ACCEPTANCE IS SHOWN
HERE TO HAVE EXISTED.
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Our next point of argument is that assun1ing the
attempted limitation of liability by the defendant bailee
is not void a.s ttgainst public policy, nevertheless it did
not brrome effectiYe here for the reason there was no
acquiescence thereto by plainntiff and such acqiescence is essential.
rrhe decisions of the courts whiCh permit a bailee
to limitell his liability by contract uniformly hold that
such limiation must be acquieesced in by the bailor, and
such acquuiescenco may not be inferred from the fact
a visible notice was posted, or that the bailor accepted
a check stub upon \Vhich the limitation was printe·J.
The theory of these decisions is that when the bailee
accepts the bailed property, a common law bailment
thus is established, and he becomes liable to the bailor
for the value of the property upon failure to redeliver.
A limitation of this liability constitutes a new contract. The posting of the notice, or the printing of
the limitation on the check stub may be held to constitute the offer by the bailee to limit his liability, but
to become effective, it must he accepted in some way
by the bailor. Such acceptance by the bailor may be
inferred when, after actual knowledge by him of the
printing on the stub, he accepts and retains it without protest.
In the instant case, however, the court specifically
found as the fact that the plaintiff "did not read the
printing on said parcel check'' ; that he ''did not see
or read the sign posted by the defendant"; that "neither defendant or defendant's agents called plaintiff's
attention to the information contained in said printed
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portion of the parcel chsck and receipt or to the information contained on the sign''; that defendant did
not ''in any way advise the plaintiff of any specific
conditions or terms under which it accepted the possession of the bag and its contents"; and that "plaintiff
had no knowledge of any limitation of liability on the
part of the defendant". (Finding No. 7)
Thus, having expressly found a total lack of actual
notice or knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of defendant's purported limitation of liability, the court
concluded as a matter of law that the limitation became
and was effective. This conclusion plaintiff assails as
being erroneous. The following cases support plaintiff's
contentions.
In Jones v. Great Northern Railroad Company,
(Montana), 217 Pac. 673, plaintiff sued defendant for
the value of a lost traveling bag deposited by plaintiff
with defendant for safekeeping in its baggage room,
and which defendant failed to return. As in this case,
plaintiff had received a check stub upon which defendant had caused to he printed a limitation of liability.
The court laid down the rule as follows:
"It is elementary that in order to create a contract there must have been a meeting of minds,
or stated differently, there must have been an
offer by one party and its unqualified accept·
ance by the other. Since -it was competent for'
the defendant as warehousem{an to presc,ribe
the terms upon which it would render the ser·
vices contemplated, it may he conceded that by
tendering the checks it ·made an offer to receive
24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and care for the parcels upon the terms expressed by the matter printed upon them, so that
the real question, reduced to its simplest forms,
resolYes itself into this: Did plaintiffs accept
the terms thus proposed 1 If they had received
the checks and had read understandingly the
matter printed upon them and then retained
them without objection, they would be held to
haYe consented to the terms imposed and bound
by the proYisions for limited liability. As to
the correctness of this rule there cannot he any
controversey. If they had received the checks
and reta·ift~ed them 'Without knowing that they
contained any terms or conditions and without
notice from the bailee and upon the assumption
that the checks were merely the means of identifying their property, they would not be held
bound by the provis_ion for limited liabiltiy, upon
the theory that the minds of the parties never
met; hence the special contract was never entered into." (Italics added)
Further the court stated :
''If the bailee does not call attention to the provision for limited liability and the bailor does
not have actual knowledge of its existence, he
is not bound by it unless his course of conduct
is such as to lead the bailee, as a reasonable
person, · to believe that he assents to the provision; and the mere fact that he retains the
check without objection does not, as a matter
of law, constitute such conduct, and in the absence of notice from the bailee that the check
contains provisions which are intended to become a part of the contract, the bailor is not
under legal duty to read whatever inscription
may be upon it."
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In Lebkeucher v. Penn,sylvania Railway Company,(N. J.), 116A. 323, a case involving a similar factual
situation, and attempted limitation of liability by the
bailee, the court held:
"The parties to a bailment may diminish the
liability of the bailee by special contract, the
principle being that the bailee may impose whatever terms he chooses, if he gives the bailor notice that there are special terms and the means
of knowing what they are; and, if the bailor
chooses to make the bailment, he is bound by
them, provided the contract is not in violation
of the law or of public policy and that it stops
short of protection in case of fraud or negligence of the bailee, and provided further that
the terms of the contract are clear, such stipulations being strictly construed. 6 Corpus Juris,
Page 1112, Section 44.
''This we think a correct statement of the law.
The bailee must bring home to the bailor notice
of the special terms upon which the bailment
is accepted in order to limit liability. In the
present case the district court found as a fact
that Mrs. Lebkeucher did not know and was not
infomed of the limiation of the liability expressed on the check or upon the placards. In
this court we must accept the findings of fact
made by the district court, if there be evidence
to support them. There was such evidence in
the case. It being necessary for the bailee to
give to the bailor notice of the special terms
of limitation of libility, and \the trial court
having found that such notice was not given,
it follows that the bailee is responsible for the
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Yalue of the suitcase and contents and is precluded from limiting its liability therefor to
$25.00. ''
In Healy 'l'. lve w York Central and Hudson Railroad Company, 138 N. Y. S. 287, affirmed 105 N. E.
1086, likewise involving a similar factual situation, it
was held:
''The business of checking hand baggage at railway stations has become a large and important
one. It seems to me that any one in the ordinary
course of business, checking his baggage at such
a place, would regard the check received as a
mere token to enable him to identify his baggage
when called for, and that in no sense would he
have any reason to believe that it .embodied a
contract exempting the bailee from liability or
limiting the amount thereof. If the plaintiff
knew that the defendant bad limited its liability
to $10.00, either by his attention being called to
it or otherwise, then, of course, the law would
deem him to have assented to it, so that a binding
contract would be effected. If be did not know
it, I think the law imposed no duty upon him to
read his check to find whether or not there was
a contract printed thereon, or that he was guilty
of neglect in not so reading it, because be bad no
reason to apprehend that a contract was printed
thereon.''
In Agricultural Insurance Company vs. Constantine,
(Ohio), (8) N. E. '(2) 658, it was held:
''The great weight of authority in this
country is to the effect that a ticket, such as was
delivered to this bailor, is a mere token for identification (Healy v. New York C. & Hudson R. Co.,
210 N.Y. 646, 105 N.E. 1086, affirming 153 App.
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Div. 516, 138 N.Y.S. 287; Denver Union Terminal
Ry. Co. v. Cullinan, 72 Colo. 248, 210 P. 602, 27
A.L.R. 154; Jones v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 68
Mont. 231, 217 P. 673, 37 A.L.R. 754) and printed
conditions thereon purportedly limiting the bailee's liability, become no part of the contract, at
least in the absence of anything to indicate that
the bailor assented to the conditions before delivering the property to the bailee (Fessler V8.
Detroit Taxicab & Transfer Co., 204 Mich. 694,
171 N.W. 360, 5 A.L.R. 983; 11aynord v. James,
109 Conn. 365, 146 A. 614, 65 A.L.R. 427)."

In Brown v. Hines, (Mo.) 249 S. W. 683, the court
held:
''Regardless of whether the defendant could contract against its negligence, there was clearly no
contract entered into in this case, as there was no
agreement made by the plaintiff. In. fact, he
had no knowledge whatever of the limitation."
* * * * * * * * *

''There was no showing that plaintiff agreed to
the conditions printed upon the check, for the
reason that he had checked parcels before at the
same check stand and that he saw printed matter,
which he did not read, upon the check that he
reeeived when he checked the bag in question,
as his consent cannot be inferred from these
facts.''
In Green's Executors v. Smith, (Va.), 131 S. E. 846,
it was held (syllabus 3) :
''In action by garage keeper to recover over
damages he was compelled to pay for injury
caused by his employee in calling for defendant's
car under storage agreement, evidence failing to
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show that defendant had notice of condition
sought to be imposed by garage keeper by circulars inclosed with bill under contract, that owner
of car hold him harmless from liability incurred
in delivering and calling· for it, held not to show
mutuality of assent necessary to sustain eontract.''
In VanNoy Intersta.te Cmnpany v. Tucker, (Miss.),
87 So. 643, it was held:
''In a case decided by the Appellate Division of
the Supreme Court of New York, Healy v. N.Y.C.
& H. R.R. Co., 153 App. Div. 516, 138 N. Y.
S. 287, in a case very much like the case made by
this record, had this to say, viz. :
'The coupon was presumptively intended as
between the parties to serve the special
purpose of affording a means of identifying
the parcel left by the bailor. In the mind of
the bailor the little piece of cardboard, which
was undoubtedly hurriedly banded to him
and which he doubtless as hurriedly slipped
into his pocket, without any reasonable opportunity to read it, and hastened away without any suggestion having been made upon
the part of the parcel room clerk as to the
statements in fine print thereon, did not
arise to the dignity of a contract by which
he agreed that in the event of the loss of the
parcel, even through the negligence of the
bailee itself, he would accept therefor a sum
which perhaps would be but a small fraetion
of its actual value.
'The plaintiff having had no knowledge of
the existence of the special contract limiting
the liability of the defendant to an amount
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not exceeding ·,~·10.00, and not "Qeing chargeable with such knowledge, the minds of the
parties never met thereon, and the plaintiff
cannot. be deemed to have assented thereto,
and is not bound thereby.'
"We adopt the decision of the New York court
as the law of this case."
Thus, we submit, the lower court having spec.ifically
found a lack of notice or knowledge on the part of the
plaintiff of defendant's attempted limitation of liability,
it should, as a matter of law, have awarded plaintiff
damages in the full value of the bag and contents, and
its conclusion that defendant's limitation of liability
became effective despite such want of notice or knowledge was clearly erroneous. Plaintiff's acceptance of
the check stub without notice or knowledge of the
limitation printed thereon, and without knowledge of
the printing on the placard did not constitute assent to
the limitation.
-IV.
EVEN THOUGH IT BE HELD THAT PLAINTIFF ACCEPTED THE LIMITATION OF LIABILITY OFFERED BY DffiFENDANT, NEVERTHELESS THE LIMITATION RELATED SOLELY
TO "LOSS OF, DAMAGE OR DELAY TO" ANY.
PARCEL AND DID NOT BY ITS TEH~1S PURPORT
TO RELATE TO A LOSS RESULTING FROM DEFENDANT'S CONVERSION.
We have heretofore demonstrated by the citation of
many authorities that defendant's attempted limitation
of liability did not and could not, under the facts as
found by the court, rise to the dignity of a contract,
30
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and unless and until it did, such limitation could not
become effective. We now propose to show that even if
it did become effective as a valid contract, it did not
become operative here, because this type of loss was
not within the limitations prescribed.
Reference to the notice and to the matter on the
printed stub discloses that the $25.00 limitation relates
only to ''loss of'' or •'damage or delay to'' any parcel.
Our point is that the limitation is thus restricted, and
does not apply to defendant's conversion of the checked
bag.
Here we again invite the attention of the court to
the lower court's finding that the bag was delivered
by defendant to some person other than plaintiff; and
to this court's holding in the case of Potomac Insurarnce
Company r. Nickson, supra, to the effect that misdelivery by a bailee constitutes ·a conversion.
"Misdelivery, therefore, clearly distinguishes the
case at bar from a case where the property is
stolen or lost through some other misadventure.
In a case of misdelivery, that can, in and of itself,
amounts to a conversion of the prpperty held;
while the stealing of property intrusted to the
bailee may or may not constitute conversion, depending upon his conduct and freedom from
negligence.''
The rule of construction applied to contracts of
limitation upon a bailee's liability is that the language
thereof is to be strictly construed. The general statement of such rule is to be found in 6 Am. Jur., Page
280, as follows:
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"As a general rule, in such cases the authorities
hold to the effect that assuming that such a contract is permissible, its language must be clear
and unambiguous ; and sinc.e such a provision
is unreasonable, it will be strictly construed by
the courts and will not be interpreted as effecting the exemption if any other meaning may
reasonably he ascribed to the language employed.''
Also,

Fessler v. Detroit Taxi and Transfer Company,
(Mich.), 171 N.W. 360.
Adams Express Company v. Berry & Whitmore
Co1npany, 35 App. D. 208, 31 L.R.A. (NS) 309.
Gulf Compress Co. vs. Harrington, 90 Ark. 256,
119 S.W. 249, 23 L.R.A. (NS) 1205;
Marks v. New Orleans Cold Storage Co., 197 La.
172, 31 So. 671, 57 L.R.A. 271, 90 Am. St. Rep.
285.
Woodward v. Royal Carpet Cleaning Co., 16 La.
App. 555 134 So. 443, citing R.C.L.
Minnesota Butter & Cheese Co. v. St. Pmtl Cold
Storage lVareho1.tse Co., 75 Jlfinn. 445, 77 N. W.
977, 74 Am. St. Rep. 515.
We thus have a situation where defendant seeks to
extend the limitation relating to "loss" or "damage"
or "delay" to its own conversion. But certainly the
reasonable interpretation to be given this limiting language is that defendant sought to limit its liability for
loss resulting from misadventure over which it had no
reasonable control. Surely it did not intend to limit
its liability where it itself converted the bailed property.
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And even if it did, it strains credulity to the breaking
point to assume that this plaintiff, or any other reasonable person, \Yonld, in delivering his property to a
bailee, in effect assl'nt to the bailee's conversion thereof.
But even if it be conceded that this plaintiff, or others,
might be so unwary as to assent to a limitation upon
liability even in the case of a conversion by the bailee,
we respectfully sumbit that public policy would not
yield thereto, and any such limitation must of necessity
be declared null and void.
The rule was so expressed in Adams Express Company v. Berry & Whitmore, supra,
"It is evident that the only way in which a
carrier may be relieved from its common-law
obligation to pay the full value of goods lost
through its negligence is by means of a special
contract with the shipper, as above noted. It
is also clear, according to the ordinary rules of
construction, that such relief is only to the extent named in that contract. New York C. R.
Vo. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 21 L. Ed. 627.
Is it possible for the carrier to extend this doctrine of contractual limitation of liability to cover
cases where the goods are converted or embezzled by it~ We think not. So great would be
the opportunity for fraud that public policy will
not suffer a practice so manifestly calculated to
invite it. That the shipper, in a particular instance, might be willing to make such a concession, does not alter the rule; it is not within the
power of the individual to. barter away the right
to protection inherent in the general public.''
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Thus, we say, that even though plaintiff had as.
sented to the limitation of liability asserted by defendant, although the facts found by the lower court do
not permit any such assumption, the limitation may not
be extended to cover the conversion of plaintiff's bag
by defendant, first, because the limitation did not by its
terms purport to cover a conversion, and, second, if it
did, it would be void as against public policy.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff submits that
under the facts as found by the court, which findings
are conclusive in this appeal, the court should have
awarded plaintiff damages in the full value of his hag
and the contents thereof (which value the court found
to he $2,190.00), and the lower court erred in limiting
defendant's liability to plaintiff in the sum of $25.00.
Respectfully submitted,

CLYDE C. PATTERSON,
HOWELL, STINE & OLMSrrEAD,
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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